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Price Competition and Product Differentiation when Consumers
Care for the Environment
1.
Introduction* Although nowadays ecologically relevant behavior is expected from a consumer, there are still consumers who buy canned beer or bottled juice under a no refund claim system instead of buying beverages under the deposit-refund system. Consumers also buy paper produced from trees instead of paper recovered from waste paper or normal food instead of eco-or biofood. They buy cars with a big engine and a bad mileage per liter gasoline instead of a threeliter car. They prefer to use the airplane instead of the train although of a relatively short travel distance, they purchase conventional bulbs instead of electricity saving bulbs or they prefer energy-inefficient halogen light instead of neon tubes. Consumers' individual decisions are based on utility maximizing behavior, but there is a trade-off between utility derived from preferred characteristics of a product and between the moral behavior of buying "green", expected by part of the society. There is product differentiation with respect to environmental friendly characteristics with positive market shares for producers who care about these characteristics and for producers who don't. If a consumer buys a product which lacks any environmental friendly characteristics, he might have a bad conscience because environmental awareness is expected from him. His environmental attitude is influenced by friends, parents, partners, or by the media, but it is often not strong enough to push the market share of environmental incompatible products towards zero and that one of the environmentally friendly substitute towards one. One reason is that producers are aware of the conflict of consumers between preferred characteristics and their environmental incompatibility. They know that customers, getting their preferred characteristics from an environmental friendly product, welcome that coincidence but if environmental aspects are missing, they might anyhow buy the product.
Producers respond to consumer's utility from a product and his disutility from not being environmental friendly in various ways. In addition to offering different characteristics, producers can choose prices such as to prevent the loss of market shares.
* I am grateful to Peter Hasfeld for helpful suggestions.
A price could be attractive to the consumer because characteristics of the product offered are similar. In that case, price competition is high. But consumers may also accept higher prices because environmental friendly products are costlier to produce, making these products more expensive. We will develop a standard model of price competition and product differentiation 1 incorporating the aforementioned environmental awareness of the consumers.
The model is similar in spirit to a paper by Grilo, Shy and Thisse (2001) in which equilibrium prices are determined when consumer behavior is characterized by phenomena like conformity or vanity. 2 We will describe market equilibria in which firms choose the characteristics of their respective products as well as their prices. Our analysis is based on a two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, each firm chooses the characteristic of its product (more or less environmental friendly). Then, having observed its rival's characteristics, in the second stage of the game each firm chooses its price. The set of players therefore consists of two firms and a continuum of potential customers represented by the unit interval. They choose from which firm to buy having observed prices and characteristics.
Our objective is to confront our results with those derived in the literature on price competition through product differentiation (e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982) ). In these models the two firms will choose distinct qualities and both will enjoy positive profits at equilibrium.
The intuitive idea behind this result is that, as their qualities become close, price competition between the increasingly similar products reduces the profit of both firms. The open question is whether under environmental awareness the equilibrium will be still unique, whether product differentiation will be maximal, and whether profits will be still positive when the costs of production increase with quality, i.e. with environmental properties. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model of price and product differentiation and characterize the Nash equilibria. In section 3 we look for social welfare maximizing environmental characteristics and for policy instruments to affect firms' decisions on characteristics towards social ones. Section 4 concludes the paper. 1 The standard model has been set out by D'Aspremont et al. (1979) by correcting Hotelling's (1929) "principle of minimum differentiation". They show that no equilibrium price solution exists when both sellers are not far enough from each other. They consider a slightly modified version of Hotelling's model for which there exists a price equilibrium solution everywhere. In this version there is a tendency for both sellers to maximize their differentiation.
2 See also a model of social distance by Akerlof (1997) that is useful for understanding social decisions.
The model
We consider an oligopolistic (duopolistic) market where the two firms compete not only in prices but also in quality. Quality here means that the product differs in terms of its environmental characteristics. When the firm decides on the degree of environmental friendliness of its product, it has to anticipate the strategic effects of its decision on price and attribute of its competitor's product. Our non-cooperative game considers two stages: In the first stage the firms simultaneously choose their respective characteristics. In the second stage they compete in prices. At this stage the characteristics are fixed and irreversible, so that price competition is influenced by the degree of product differentiation. Firms will take this into account when deciding on the characteristics. Our model differs from standard models of product differentiation because of the introduction of a consumption externality. for a unit of the good of property q is defined by:
in which r stands for the gross, intrinsic utility a consumer derives from consuming one unit of the product. In the tradition of spacial models of product differentiation, it is assumed that r is sufficiently large to ensure that all consumers prefer buying rather than dropping out of the 4 We incorporate environmental concern directly into individual preferences.
There are at least three separate justifications for doing this. First, the assumption that individuals care about the environment is consistent with evidence. Second, evolutionary pressures could well produce preferences of this form. Third, deviations from social environmental awareness are punished by loss of social "reputation" (not being "in"). 5 The utility of consumer θ when buying from i is then defined by
where i p is the price of firm i (i = 1, 2). The utility (2) captures different types of product differentiation together with a social externality. 6 The consumer feels he should consider to buy "green" but his preferences are different. Social pressure as an externality compels him to incorporate environmental aspects into his preferences.
The market is modeled as a two-stage game, the solution of which is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. In the first stage, firms select their characteristics. In the second one, given any pair of characteristics, the firms choose their prices. By backwards induction we want to determine for a given pair of characteristics ( )
,all the price pairs for which both firms have a strictly positive demand. We therefore are interested in finding a consumer
who is indifferent between the two suppliers, given their prices ( ) 1 2 , p p . For that, θ must satisfy the following equation:
Using (2) and solving (3) for θ yields:
4 See Bernheim (1994) for a model of social interaction in which individuals care about status as well as "intrinsic" utility. 5 In the status model by Akerlof (1997) , the individual chooses a status-producing variable x to maximize an utility function ( )
where the person loses utility in amount ( ) (4)
for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.
In producing the two characteristics we assume that costs increase in q. Environmental friendly products incur higher costs to produce them. Profits are then defined as follows:
From the FOCs for a profit-maximizing price strategy we obtain the following reaction functions:
Firm i's best response on the price of its competitor depends on the characteristics chosen by the firms at the first stage of the game. Solving the reaction functions for 1 p and 2 p yields the unique equilibrium prices:
Since for horizontal product differentiation 1 2 0 2d < + − < , prices are positive. Evaluating the marginal consumer (4) at the price equilibrium, we have (11) ( )
Proposition
Consumer awareness of the environment, d, lowers the price * 1 p and raises the price * 2
p . The market share of firm 1 will decline and the one of firm 2 will increase, i.e.
( )
Second, higher costs of production, c, reduces the market share of the environmentally concerned firm 2. Both firms raise their prices but the price increase of firm 2 is higher than the one of firm 1. The spread of their prices increases and depends on the difference in product differentiation
These conclusions only hold if 1 q and 2 q are fixed. When choosing the characteristics at the first stage of the game, firms take into account the effect of their quality decisions on the price, set at the second stage. Profit of firm i is ( . It is well known that in the conventional case ( )
exists no interior solution. Both firms choose maximal product differentiation by producing 1 0 q = and 2 1 q = . Solving the simultaneous system (13) and (14) yields (15) ( )
− .
An interior solution for 1 0 q ≥ would require 1 2 d c − ≥ , and for 2 1 q ≤ the inequality 1 2 d c − ≤ − . We conclude that there exists no interior Nash equilibrium in characteristics.
We next characterize three equilibria of ( )
,, depending on the difference d c − .
It is 1 0 q ≥ from (15) and 2 1 q = as 2 q must not exceed one. According to (13), the best response of firm 1 on 2 1 q = is 1 1 
* 1
is a Nash equilibrium in the characteristics 1 q and 2 q .
Case (ii):
It is 2 1 q ≤ from (16) and 1 0 q = as 1 q can not become negative. The best response (14) of
We conclude:
Proposition 3: Proposition 4:
is a Nash equilibrium in ( )
The market shares in our three cases can be determined by inserting * * 1 2 ,in (11) and (12): Table 1 we present the characteristics, prices, market shares and profit for our three Nash-equilibria. As values for d c − we choose an upper bound, a lower bound and an intermediate value (we set 1 t = for simplification). becomes somewhat weaker, firm 1 differentiates its product towards being less environmental friendly. It raises by this strategy its market share and profit. However, firm 2 benefits from the environmental concern by having a market share of at least 2 3 as well as higher profits than firm 1. The 2. Nash eq. case we call weak environmental concern. The values in Table 1 start with a case where costs dominate environmental concern only weakly. 
Social welfare maximizing characteristics
The next step is to check for market failure in the sense that the private choice of the characteristics might differ from the social optimal one preferred by an environmental authority. For that purpose we define social welfare as a function of 1 q and 2 q . It is equal to the aggregate willingness to pay minus cost of production. Therefore
The market share θ separates the consumers with higher welfare from 1 q from those with higher welfare from 2 q . It is determined by the consumer being indifferent between welfare from 1 q and welfare from 2 q : The only possibility is to affect d or c in the corresponding interval 1 1 d c − < − < such that the private outcome is one of the other two Nash equilibria. Since one policy parameter is needed to end up in another equilibrium and another policy parameter to adjust private environmental qualities to the social ones, a campaign has to be launched as well as a tax or subsidy to be paid to achieve the social outcome.
Summary and conclusion
Increasing environmental awareness may affect the pleasure of consuming a good for which an environmental friendly substitute is available. When deciding to buy differentiated products, a compromise is sometimes made between preferred characteristics of the good and its environmental properties. In this paper we have investigated the market implication of product differentiation when customers are concerned about environmental aspects of the good. We have used the spacial duopoly model to determine how environmental concern affects prices, product characteristics and market shares of the competing firms.
We first have solved the second stage of the game, that is, price competition when differences in quality exists. The unique equilibrium prices and market shares are affected by consumer awareness of the environment and by the higher costs for producing those goods.
We next determined the characteristics at the first stage of the game when firms take into account the effect of their quality decisions on profit, price and hence on market shares. We found no interior Nash equilibrium 1 2 0 , 1> < but three Nash equilibria of the type
and ( ) * * 1 2 0, 1= = , depending on the parameter constellations. The market share of the environmental good increases in each type with environmental concern and it declines if costs are higher to produce those goods.
In order to find out whether the market functions in an optimal way we have to compare the private decisions on quality with the choice of quality by a welfare maximizing authority. We found that the social welfare maximizing characteristics are not the same as the quality distribution by private firms in the three Nash equilibria. It is, however, possible to choose environmental policy instruments to stimulate private firms to produce the social optimal quality distribution. Depending on the type of the Nash equilibrium, the government can either choose a subsidy on costs or can launch a campaign in favor of environmental awareness, or it can raise the cost of a product by a tax or can announce its environmental irrelevance if producers care more for the environment than is socially justified. 
Proof of (22):
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